

## The Militarizing of Hawai'i

### *Occupation, Accommodation, and Resistance*

Militarization is a step-by-step process by which a person or a thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well-being on militaristic ideas. The more militarization transforms an individual or a society, the more that individual or society comes to imagine military needs and militaristic presumptions to be not only valuable but also normal. Militarization, that is, involves cultural as well as institutional, ideological, and economic transformations.

—Cynthia Enloe, *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives*

The forces of militarism and imperialism have indelibly shaped modern Hawai'i. At the crossroads of Asia-Pacific commerce, Hawai'i has long been a centerpiece of U.S. military strategy. Over a hundred years have elapsed since the United States of America militarily intervened in the sovereign Kingdom of Hawai'i and forever changed the course of Hawaiian history, and still militarism continues to exert a powerful influence over the social, economic, and cultural affairs of Hawai'i.

Militarism in Hawai'i cannot be reduced to a simple product of military policy. Instead, it must be understood as the result of a complex interaction of forces, including the political and economic fears and ambitions of global powers; the way key actors in the local society either resisted, accommodated, or collaborated in the process of militarization; the deployment of strategies to normalize and maintain militarism; and the interplay of ideologies of race, class, and gender that not only justified but often encouraged the expansion of empire.

While most histories of Hawai'i have overlooked the central role of the U.S. military, a few social critics have attempted to describe the militarization of Hawai'i. Some have emphasized the role of global forces and events in the militarization of

Hawai‘i.<sup>1</sup> Others have analyzed how certain civilian sectors, in the pursuit of their own interests, collaborated in the militarization of Hawai‘i.<sup>2</sup> More recent studies have illuminated how militarism relies upon various discursive strategies to cloak itself in an aura of inevitability and naturalness and “produce processes of militarization that are hidden in plain sight.”<sup>3</sup> While U.S. military hegemony today seems nearly unassailable, militarism in Hawai‘i has its contradictions and weaknesses, what Ian Lind calls “structural sources of tension.”<sup>4</sup> These contradictions present openings for intervention and social change.

Militarism in Hawai‘i has developed through the push and pull of local, national, and global interests over time. Often these interests converged; sometimes they competed against each other. As Lind suggests, “despite surface appearances, militarism is inherently unstable.”<sup>5</sup> Throughout the different phases of militarism in Hawai‘i, the interests that most often prevailed were that of colonizers and settlers. In this contest Kānaka Maoli, the indigenous people of Hawai‘i, lost the most.<sup>6</sup> But they also resisted and sometimes changed the course of militarism in Hawai‘i. Their movements represent hope that people can transform Hawai‘i socially, culturally, politically, and environmentally from an occupied nation, disfigured by war and addicted to militarism, into a free state, a model of nonviolence and of just social, cultural, economic, and environmental conduct.

This essay (1) briefly surveys the history and current status of militarism in Hawai‘i; (2) considers some of the impacts of militarism in Hawai‘i; and (3) examines some key contemporary examples of resistance to militarism.

## The Militarization of Hawai‘i

The development of U.S. military institutions in Hawai‘i was driven by a desire to expand the United States’ trade with Asia and its influence in the Pacific. As a vital refueling and provisioning stop on transpacific trade routes, Hawai‘i was considered key to economic and military hegemony in the Pacific. Not to be outdone by European colonial powers that were snatching up colonies in the Pacific, U.S. President John Tyler in 1842 claimed Hawai‘i as part of the U.S. sphere of influence. This so-called Tyler Doctrine extended the racist ideology of “Manifest Destiny” into the Pacific.

In 1873 General John M. Schofield and Lieutenant Colonel Burton S. Alexander, disguised as tourists, secretly surveyed Hawai‘i for suitable naval ports. Upon spying Ke Awalau o Pu‘uloa (the Kanaka Maoli name for Pearl Harbor, meaning “the many harbors of Pu‘uloa”), Schofield concluded, “It is the key to the Central Pacific Ocean, it is the gem of these islands.”<sup>7</sup>

Hawai‘i’s haole (white) elite, the sugar planters and merchants, leveraged U.S. desire for a naval base in Hawai‘i to their own advantage. They forced King David

Kalākaua to enact the “Bayonet Constitution”<sup>8</sup> and sign a Treaty of Reciprocity with the United States that gave the U.S. exclusive access to Pearl Harbor in exchange for lowering the tariff for Hawai‘i-grown sugar.

On January 16, 1893, when King Kalākaua’s successor, Queen Lili‘uokalani, attempted to enact a new constitution to restore Native Hawaiian power in the government, U.S. foreign minister John Stevens, conspiring with haole leaders, landed American troops from the USS *Boston*. On January 17, with American guns aimed at ‘Iolani Palace, the haole leaders deposed the Queen and declared a new provisional government. U.S. President Grover Cleveland condemned the U.S. military intervention as an illegal act of war against a friendly nation and called for the restoration of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i. Anti-annexation forces successfully held off two attempts to ratify treaties of annexation. However, the political winds shifted against Hawai‘i in 1898. With the outbreak of war with Spain, the U.S. military stepped up efforts to seize Hawai‘i. On July 6, 1898, Congress passed a simple joint resolution purporting to annex Hawai‘i. Nearly overnight, Hawai‘i was transformed into the hub of the United States’ vast military enterprise in the Pacific and a launch pad for its imperial thrust into Asia.

U.S. occupation ushered in a period of unprecedented military expansion in Hawai‘i. Construction of a naval base at Pearl Harbor began in 1900, and it was soon followed by Fort Shafter, Fort Ruger, Fort Armstrong, Fort DeRussy, Fort Kamehameha, Fort Weaver, and Schofield Barracks. Brigadier General Montgomery M. Macomb, commander of the U.S. Army, Pacific (Hawaiian Department) from 1911 to 1914, stated, “Oahu is to be encircled with a ring of steel.”<sup>9</sup>

In the territorial period leading up to World War II, Hawai‘i’s haole oligarchy formed an alliance with the military establishment. The military and the haole elite shared two key interests: the industrialization of the islands and the maintenance of white settler rule in Hawai‘i.

The bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, provided the justification and opportunity for the military to bring Hawai‘i under military discipline.<sup>10</sup> Plans for concentration camps and martial law, which had been in the works for years, were quickly implemented. As martial law took effect, Japanese community leaders were arrested and put in concentration camps. In his study, *Cane Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii, 1865–1945*, Gary Okihiro describes how the Japanese in Hawai‘i were driven to “superpatriotism” by anti-Japanese racism.

The nisei [second-generation Japanese] plight was an essential part of the military’s strategy for maintaining economic and political stability. Nisei were driven to patriotism, with virtually no other choice. Furthermore, the definition of patriotism, as determined by Hawaii’s political and military leaders,

meant subordination to their will whether that meant quiet acceptance of inequality or complicity in the destruction of things Japanese.<sup>11</sup>

In response to this anti-Japanese reaction, many young Japanese men enlisted in the U.S. military to prove their loyalty to the United States. After the war Japanese American veterans returned home with heightened expectations of social and economic advancement. Many of them were educated on the G.I. Bill and entered business and government.

Ironically, even as the war unleashed intense racism against Hawai'i's Japanese community, it hastened the demise of the old plantation power structure and brought what Lind called a "military-industrial-revolution" that opened up new economic and social possibilities for Asians in Hawai'i.<sup>12</sup> World War II and the U.S. military facilitated the transformation of Hawai'i's Japanese into "Japanese Americans." The heroism and sacrifice of nisei veterans became legend, but the powerful iconography of the World War II nisei vet was used to expedite the forced assimilation, the Americanization, of Hawai'i's Japanese. War was the theater in which the nisei redeemed themselves in a grand morality play, where individuals from an oppressed group could overcome racial discrimination by demonstrating unquestioning loyalty to the United States and making enormous personal and collective sacrifices in war. Men like U.S. Senator Daniel Inouye, former U.S. Representative Spark Matsunaga, former governor George Ariyoshi, and former Bishop Estate trustee Matsuo Takabuki became celebrated icons in that mythology. But this story oversimplifies the complex convergence of events and factors that enabled Japanese settlers to gain power in post-World War II Hawai'i, and it obscures the tragic consequences of this development for Kānaka Maoli.

The nisei veterans' rise to political power in the so-called "Democratic Revolution" of 1954 was made possible in part by the organization of the militant International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU), which had won a string of significant organizing victories in the plantations and docks after World War II. However, the nisei veterans joined the anti-communist witch hunts of the late 1940s and early 1950s to drive radical voices out of the movement.<sup>13</sup> Matsuo Takabuki, a nisei veteran who became one of the most influential men of the postwar era, recalls in his memoirs, "The Burns group and I worked with my 442nd and 100th Battalion friends to take over these precincts from the ILWU faction."<sup>14</sup>

The sweeping reforms promised by the Democrats reaffirmed colonial American values—assimilation, individualism, and middle-class aspirations of material wealth, status, and power. George Cooper and Gavan Daws observe that "the vast majority of Hawai'i's elected Democrats turned out not to be revolutionaries, but just practical politicians with an eye to bringing some new social groups into posi-

tions of relative affluence and influence.”<sup>15</sup> Takabuki himself admits, “Our social and economic goals were not revolutionary. We wanted to accelerate the changes that had begun during the war, not destroy the system.”<sup>16</sup> The new Democrats saw statehood as the ticket to “first-class citizenship.”

The Cold War brought massive military expenditures to Hawai‘i, and this, coupled with the expansion of corporate tourism, ushered in a period of unparalleled economic growth. As Cooper and Daws observe, the Democrats rose to power in “the biggest boom in Hawaii’s history.”<sup>17</sup> In their rise to power, the Democratic leadership in Hawai‘i forged a new partnership with the military. Looking to modernize Hawai‘i’s economy but lacking the capital to do so, the young Democrats “embraced defense spending as a welcome alternative” to the plantation economy.<sup>18</sup> By the 1940s military spending had overtaken sugar and pineapple to become the largest source of revenue for the islands. Democrats sought to leverage their influence to maximize the benefit from these expenditures and maneuvered themselves into key congressional posts where they would have influence in military appropriations.<sup>19</sup>

As Haunani-Kay Trask, a professor of Hawaiian studies and an activist, writes,

For our Native people, Asian success proves to be but the latest elaboration of foreign hegemony. The history of our colonization becomes a twice-told tale, first of discovery and settlement by European and American businessmen and missionaries, then of the plantation Japanese, Chinese, and eventually Filipino rise to dominance in the islands. . . . As a people, Hawaiians remain a politically subordinated group suffering all the legacies of conquest: landlessness, disastrous health, diaspora, institutionalization in the military and prisons, poor educational attainment, and confinement to the service sector of employment.<sup>20</sup>

## The State of Militarized Hawai‘i

Today, despite some military “downsizing,” Hawai‘i remains one of the most highly militarized places on the planet, a “linchpin” of U.S. empire in the Asia-Pacific region. The military controls 205,925 acres, or roughly 5 percent, of the total land in Hawai‘i,<sup>21</sup> down from a peak of 600,000 acres in 1944.<sup>22</sup> On O‘ahu, the most densely populated island, the military controls 85,718 acres out of 382,148 acres, or 22.4 percent of the island. The military also controls vast Defensive Sea Areas—submerged lands in Kāne‘ohe Bay, from Pearl Harbor to Koko Head and off the west shore of Kaua‘i.<sup>23</sup> Throughout the archipelago, the combined armed

services have twenty-one installations, twenty-six housing complexes, eight training areas, and nineteen miscellaneous bases and operating stations.<sup>24</sup>

The U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) has 300,000 military personnel in the theater (one-fifth of the total U.S. active-duty military force), including 100,000 forward-deployed troops in the western Pacific.<sup>25</sup> In 2000 there were 33,930 armed forces and 50,804 military dependents stationed in Hawai'i. Combined with the 112,000 veterans living in Hawai'i, the military population totaled 196,734, or 16 percent of Hawai'i's total population of 1,211,537.<sup>26</sup> Today the military is the second largest "industry" in Hawai'i behind tourism, with expenditures totaling approximately \$4.39 billion, or 9.8 percent of the gross state product.

The Department of Defense is currently undergoing a series of dramatic changes that will have an impact on the future of the military in Hawai'i. Technological advances have brought about what some military commentators have termed a "Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)." The Bush administration military strategy embraces these changes, focusing on high-tech weapons systems, such as missile defense, leaner and more mobile force structures, and a nuclear posture that relies on the threat of nuclear first-strike. At the same time, the administration is willing to close bases and reduce troops in order to afford these expensive new weapons.

Hawai'i's congressional delegation has consistently supported the expansion of military troops and infrastructure. Recently the army embarked on a multiphase "transformation" to reconfigure its war-fighting capabilities for future conflicts. As part of this transformation, the army proposed the largest expansion in Hawai'i since World War II.<sup>27</sup> However, the military expansion in Hawai'i runs counter to the national military trend.<sup>28</sup> Selection of Hawai'i as one of six sites to receive an Interim Brigade Combat Team is a reflection of the political clout of Hawai'i's congressional delegation and their relationship to Kaua'i-born Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki, who was a key proponent of the Stryker Brigade concept.

### *"Just the Way Things Are"*

The military maintains its hegemony in Hawai'i through a complex and diffuse network of power and persuasion that has yet to be thoroughly analyzed. It has been able to mask its imperial function by infiltrating civilian institutions (schools, universities, corporations, local government, media, tourism, charities, religious institutions) and managing public discourse. Furthermore, economic dependency keeps the military tightly enmeshed in the social fabric of Hawai'i.

Enloe observes that "militarization is such a pervasive process, and thus so hard to uproot, precisely because in its everyday forms it scarcely looks life threatening."<sup>29</sup> Moreover, Ferguson and Turnbull write, "The narratives of naturalization

imbricate military institutions and discourses into daily life so that they become 'just the way things are.' The narratives of reassurance kick in with a more prescriptive tone, marking the military presence in Hawai'i as necessary, productive, heroic, desirable, good."<sup>30</sup>

Flashpoints between the community and the military provide glimpses of what militarism looks like, how it functions, and how it can be challenged in Hawai'i. The following sections review some of the significant impacts and sources of conflict between the military and Kānaka Maoli: land, environment, and cultural survival.

### *Impacts: Militarizing the 'Āina*

Land is a central and continuing source of conflict between the military and Kānaka Maoli. The militarization of land has resulted in the alienation of Kānaka Maoli from their ancestral lands; the loss of subsistence and cultural resources; and the contamination of the air, land, and water with toxic waste, unexploded ordnance, and radiation. At its root, the conflict between Kānaka Maoli and the military over land involves a fundamental clash between the Kanaka Maoli relationship to a living 'āina (literally "that which feeds") and the Euro-American concept of "land" as flat and lifeless real estate.

In the Kanaka Maoli cosmology, the 'āina is the physical manifestation of the union between Papahānaumoku (Papa who gives birth to islands), the Earth Mother, and Wākea, the Sky Father. As an ancestor of humans, the 'āina could not be owned or sold. Lilikalā Kame'eleihiwa writes that "the 'modern' concepts of aloha 'Āina, or love of the Land, and Mālama 'Āina, or serving and caring for the Land, stem from the traditional model established at the time of Wākea."<sup>31</sup>

Militarization greatly accelerated the dispossession of Hawaiian lands. In 1898 the U.S. seized nearly 1.8 million acres of former national and crown lands of the Kingdom of Hawai'i. Existing in a kind of legal limbo, these so-called "ceded lands" are held in a quasi-trust status by the federal government and the State. In 1959, when Hawai'i was admitted as a state, the military retained control of approximately 180,000 acres of "ceded lands," while the rest reverted to the State as trustee.<sup>32</sup> Approximately 30,000 acres that were returned to the State were immediately leased back to the military for sixty-five years.<sup>33</sup> In most cases the rent paid by the military was one dollar for the term of the lease. Today 54 percent of military-held land, approximately 112,173 acres, is so-called "ceded land," commonly understood by Kānaka Maoli to be stolen land.

The military also illegally seized Hawaiian Home Lands.<sup>34</sup> In 1983 a federal-state task force concluded that 13,580 acres of Hawaiian Home Lands were improperly withdrawn through presidential executive orders. Of these improv-

erly transferred lands, 1,356 acres in Lualualei, which could have supported four thousand housing units, were removed from the Hawaiian Home Lands inventory by the navy for its ammunitions storage and radio communications complex. Homestead lands were also improperly withdrawn for military training in Humu'ula, Hawai'i, and for munitions storage in Waimea, Kaua'i.<sup>35</sup> In a 1999 land-swap agreement between the state and federal governments to settle the improper transfer, the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands received 580 acres at Barbers Point in exchange for the land at Lualualei.<sup>36</sup>

Other lands in Hawai'i were seized by the military through condemnation, a practice that peaked during World War II. Citizens filed lawsuits to prevent the taking of land or to obtain adequate compensation for lands near Pearl Harbor and in Lualualei, Kāne'ōhe, Kahō'olawe, Waikāne, and elsewhere, usually unsuccessfully.

### *Impacts: Cultural Genocide*

Land alienation, a form of colonial violence, has contributed to the cultural decline of Kānaka Maoli by not only severing the genealogical ties between Kānaka Maoli and the 'āina, but also by disrupting their ability to practice and transmit their culture to future generations. The violence continued as the military transformed the land, destroying or altering natural and cultural resources and blocking access to military-controlled areas. In the process they destroyed or disrupted Kanaka Maoli means of food production (fishing areas, fishponds, and agricultural systems for kalo, or taro, and 'uala, or sweet potato), natural resource acquisition (forests, minerals, medicinal and spiritual plants), and use of cultural sites (religious sites, burials, sacred features of the landscape).

Statistics illustrate the legacy of colonization: Kānaka Maoli have the highest rates of homelessness, poverty, disease, and crime.<sup>37</sup> They have the lowest educational achievement and life expectancy.<sup>38</sup> Kānaka Maoli make up 36.5 percent of persons incarcerated for felony charges.<sup>39</sup>

By facilitating population transfer of Americans to Hawai'i, the military has also had a profound impact on Hawai'i's culture and political demographics. In 2000 the military population, including dependents and veterans, reached 16 percent of Hawai'i's population, nearly eclipsing the Kanaka Maoli population of 239,655, or 19 percent of the total population.<sup>40</sup>

The flood of settlers stripped Kānaka Maoli of their political sovereignty, land, and cultural rights, in many ways resembling the population crises of other occupied nations, such as Tibet, East Timor, and Palestine, where the colonizer uses systematic population transfer as a policy of conquest and occupation. Economic pressures and cultural and political displacement result in nearly one-third of Kānaka Maoli living in diaspora.



### *Impacts: Environmental Assault*

In Hawai‘i the military has left a trail of environmental disasters, the full extent of which is yet to be fully comprehended. *The Military Contamination and Cleanup Atlas for the United States—1995* identified 405 military-contaminated sites designated for cleanup in Hawai‘i, 6 of which are listed as “superfund” sites (highly contaminated sites that receive priority funding for cleanup). The report does not include Johnston Island, Waikāne Valley, Kaho‘olawe, or Mākua nor the dozens of forgotten military training areas and camps that have not yet been designated for cleanup. The cost for cleanup of all the polluted sites in Hawai‘i would run into the billions of dollars.<sup>41</sup>

Some examples of the military’s environmental impacts include jet fuel, oil, and organic solvents in the soil and groundwater at Pearl Harbor, Hickam Air Force Base, and other military sites; PCBs at numerous military bases; radioactive waste;<sup>42</sup> the destruction of native ecosystems by live-fire training; unexploded ordnance; high-powered radio facilities emitting electromagnetic radiation; sonar tests that harm marine mammals;<sup>43</sup> and nerve-gas testing and disposal.<sup>44</sup>

Kānaka Maoli, recently immigrated Asians and Pacific Islanders, and low-income communities face the greatest threat from the military’s environmental assault. Many Asians and Pacific Islanders subsist on fish and shellfish from Pearl Harbor’s contaminated waters. The Wai‘anae District, with the largest concentration of Kānaka Maoli and some of the worst health, economic, and social statistics in Hawai‘i, bears the burden of the Lualualei Naval Magazine and Radio Facility and Mākua Military Reservation, which occupy a full third of the land in Wai‘anae.

### Kīpuka of Resistance

Despite the intense level of militarization in Hawai‘i, Kānaka Maoli and local people continued to resist military intrusions and disruptions. The complete history of this resistance is yet to be written. I briefly survey a few examples of resistance from the 1970s to the present.

In the 1970s, as urbanization began to encroach on rural communities, a wave of land struggles erupted. Rural communities in Hawai‘i had long held out as pockets of resistance to the forces of capitalism and imperialism, what University of Hawai‘i ethnic studies professor Davianna Pōmaika‘i McGregor has called “cultural kīpuka.”<sup>45</sup>

The struggles that emerged to protect these traditional communities from urbanization were also kīpuka for the formation of social movements. Communi-

ties began to resist, aided by young local activists who took inspiration from the civil rights, antiwar, and national liberation movements of the 1950s through the 1970s. Kanaka Maoli activism was also influenced by Native American occupations of Alcatraz Island and Wounded Knee. The land struggles that erupted in the 1970s—such as those at Kalama Valley and Waiāhole—sowed seeds of leadership, inspiration, strategy, and momentum for other struggles to take root and grow. Various strands of the movement came together in the effort to free Kahoʻolawe from military occupation and destruction, which in turn kindled other struggles and helped give birth to the modern Hawaiian sovereignty movement.

### *Kahoʻolawe: Aloha ʻĀina*

Kahoʻolawe, also known as Ko Hema Lamalama o Kanaloa,<sup>46</sup> is the smallest of the major islands in the Hawaiian archipelago, measuring approximately 28,000 acres. The island is sacred to Kānaka Maoli and considered to be kinolau (multiple physical forms; an embodiment) of Kanaloa, god of the sea. Inhabited for more than a thousand years, Kahoʻolawe contains some of the richest and most intact cultural sites in Hawaiʻi.

The navy began bombing Kahoʻolawe in 1940. With the declaration of martial law in 1941, the entire island was taken over by the navy. From 1941 to 1967 the island and its surrounding waters were off limits to the public. In 1952 an executive order by President Dwight Eisenhower gave the navy formal jurisdiction over Kahoʻolawe but stipulated that the navy was to rehabilitate the island and return it to the public in a “reasonably safe” condition when no longer needed by the military.

In 1969 protests ensued when a five-hundred-pound bomb was found over seven miles across the channel on Maui land leased to then Maui mayor Elmer Carvalho. In 1971 Carvalho and the environmental group Life of the Land sued to stop the bombing and sought an environmental impact statement (EIS) for the navy’s use of the island. The navy released a hastily prepared EIS in 1972, and the lawsuit was dismissed.

The Hawaiʻi State Senate passed a resolution requesting that the navy immediately look for alternatives to the bombing in 1974. The legislature issued a report in 1978 dismissing the military’s claim that Kahoʻolawe was irreplaceable.

Hawaiian activists, many of whom had gained experience in other land struggles, felt that it was time to take back Kahoʻolawe. On January 4, 1976, the Protect Kahoʻolawe Association (later renamed the Protect Kahoʻolawe ʻOhana or PKO) staged the first in a series of bold land occupations of Kahoʻolawe during scheduled naval exercises to protest the bombing and to assert Kanaka Maoli cultural rights. The protest was organized by the Aloha Association. While the navy appre-

hended most of the thirty-five protesters who attempted to make the crossing from Maui, nine managed to get on the island. They included George Helm, Walter Ritte Jr., and Dr. Emmett Aluli of the Moloka'i group Hui Alaloha; Kawaipuna Prejean and Stephen Morse of the Hawaiian Coalition for Native Claims; Ian Lind of the American Friends Service Committee; Ellen Miles; Kimo Aluli; and Karla Villalba. The Coast Guard captured seven of the nine within a few hours, but Ritte and Aluli eluded the military for two days before turning themselves in.<sup>47</sup>

The PKO planned to complete five landings symbolizing the five fingers of *limahana* (the working hand). The completion of the five landings symbolized the completion of the tasks and *laulima* (many hands working together).<sup>48</sup> In the ensuing acts of civil resistance, many activists were arrested. These actions led to a cultural and spiritual awakening and a deepening of political conviction for all who were involved.

Kaho'olawe became a lens for the movement that brought into focus the issues and dynamics of U.S. occupation. In January 1977 George Helm wrote about the reasons for the fourth occupation of Kaho'olawe: "Call me a radical for I refuse to remain idle. I will not have the foreigner prostitute the soul of my being, and I will not make a whore out of my soul (my culture)."<sup>49</sup> During the occupation Helm wrote in his diary, "The occupation of the military reservation is not so much a defiance as it is a responsibility to express our legitimate concern for the land of the Hawaiian. . . . We are against warfare but more so against imperialism."<sup>50</sup>

That same year that protests began the PKO filed a lawsuit against the navy alleging violations of environmental and cultural preservation laws as well as Kanaka Maoli religious freedom. In February 1977 Judge Samuel King denied two requests, one by the PKO and one by the Maui County Council, to issue temporary restraining orders against navy bombing. Later that year the PKO won a court victory when federal judge Richard Wong ruled that the navy violated both the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and an executive order that required the preservation of historic sites. The navy was ordered to redo its 1972 EIS but was allowed to continue training.

As the movement spread, local and international solidarity became an important element of the campaign to stop the bombing. Hawaiian organizations, unions, religious organizations, and even the state government adopted resolutions calling for an end to the bombing. The Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific movement pressured foreign governments to withdraw from joint military exercises on Kaho'olawe. In 1984 Japan withdrew from RIMPAC exercises.<sup>51</sup> Delegations from the PKO also visited Culebra and Vieques in Puerto Rico to learn from and lend support to struggles there to end military destruction of their islands.

In 1977 two young activists "disappeared" crossing the channel between

Kaho'olawe and Maui: George Helm, the charismatic president of the PKO and a musician, and Kimo Mitchell, a commercial fisherman and National Park Service ranger. Their deaths fueled a sense of urgency and deepened convictions in the movement as it generated wider public support.

The PKO lawsuit led to a 1980 consent decree that limited navy training on the island, mandated unexploded ordnance cleanup from one-third of the island, and allowed PKO to have regular access to the island. Following the consent decree, the entire island was placed on the National Register of Historic Places in January 1981. Archaeologists had discovered a wealth of prehistoric sites, which confirmed the cultural and spiritual significance of the island.

The consent decree was controversial within the PKO movement. Supporters of the consent decree argued that the agreement was necessary for Kānaka Maoli to exercise their culture. Critics countered that the agreement compromised fundamental principles and weakened the movement politically.

The PKO continued to press for an end to the bombing. Under the consent decree the PKO organized cultural accesses to the island at least six times a year. Although the navy argued that the island was essential to national security, they eventually lost interest in Kaho'olawe. In what was largely seen as a political move to boost the sagging election campaign of Hawai'i Republican congressional candidate Pat Saiki, in 1990 President George H.W. Bush issued an executive order discontinuing the bombing of Kaho'olawe. Saiki lost the election, but the bombs were finally silenced.

In November 1990 Congress enacted Senate Bill 3088, which established the Kaho'olawe Island Conveyance Commission to recommend the terms for returning the island to the State. In 1993 a state law created the Kaho'olawe Island Reserve Commission (KIRC) to oversee cleanup, restoration, and resource management of a Kaho'olawe cultural reserve. This statute also specified that the island would eventually be transferred to a Native Hawaiian nation upon gaining recognition from the U.S. government. Title X of the fiscal year 1994 Department of Defense Appropriations Act transferred Kaho'olawe to the State and appropriated \$400 million to clean up and restore the island. Unlike base cleanup projects that were conducted under the Base Realignment and Closure Act or other federal environmental laws, the Kaho'olawe cleanup authorized and funded as a special project the largest unexploded ordnance (UXO) removal effort ever attempted.

In 1998 the Navy began to clean up unexploded ordnance. In *Memorandum of Understanding between the Navy and State of Hawai'i*, the Navy agreed to the "removal or clearance of all unexploded ordnance from the surface of the island."<sup>52</sup> The navy was to clear another 25 percent of the island to a depth that would allow "reasonably safe use." However, in 2000 the navy reported that it would not be able

to meet these goals. When the cleanup operation wrapped up in 2003, only one-ninth of the island was safe enough for unrestricted human activity. The KIRC and PKO did not pursue legal and political options for holding the federal government accountable for its cleanup obligations.

Kahoʻolawe activists encountered challenges and contradictions to their own success. Victory required them to play politics in order to secure funding for cleanup and restoration, and activists' energies were consumed by administrative and bureaucratic functions of overseeing the restoration and transfer of the island. Nevertheless, the Kahoʻolawe struggle blazed a trail that others would continue.

### *Sowing Seeds of Resistance*

Kahoʻolawe was the first contemporary struggle to directly confront the U.S. military as an imperial force in Hawaiʻi, and it helped to illuminate the contradictions of U.S. occupation and militarism. A few of the struggles against militarism that followed are briefly described below.

**Hālawa Valley/H-3 Freeway** In 1963 the Oahu Transportation Study called for a trans-Koʻolau freeway. The freeway was justified as a defense highway to connect Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station (now Marine Corps Base Hawaii) and Pearl Harbor. In the early 1980s the legal challenge by the Stop H-3 Association successfully blocked the route through Moanalua Valley on the basis of cultural and historic preservation laws. The State realigned the project to Hālawa Valley. While the federal court blocked the second route on environmental grounds, in 1984 Senator Inouye succeeded in passing legislation that exempted the H-3 from applicable environmental laws. After a legal challenge by the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, the freeway's path was realigned around an ancient loʻi kalo (taro terrace) on the Kāneʻohe side of the Koʻolau mountains. Kānaka Maoli maintained that the site was connected to Kukui-o-Kāne Heiau, a sacred temple to the god Kāne, but the Bishop Museum disputed their claims. Parts of the heiau were destroyed.

On the leeward side, in Hālawa Valley, the freeway bisected an entire religious site complex, dividing the men's heiau from the women's heiau—Hale-o-Papa. In April 1992 a group of women started an encampment to protect Hale-o-Papa until their eviction in August of that year. Later that same year, in a demonstration organized by the Hālawa Coalition, thirteen people were arrested for blocking cement trucks entering Hālawa Valley, at a cost of more than \$200,000 to the State.<sup>53</sup> After a thirty-seven-year struggle, H-3 was completed at a cost of \$1.3 billion, or \$80 million a mile, which, according to some, made it mile for mile the most expensive roadway ever built. At the inaugural Trans-Koʻolau Run, protesters urged runners to abandon the route. A group of Kānaka Maoli and supporters have continued to mālama (care for) the sites at Hale-o-Papa.<sup>54</sup>

**Nohili/Pacific Missile Range Facility** In the early 1990s the army sought to utilize the navy's Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) on west Kaua'i for Strategic Target System (STARS) missile launches. The Nohili Coalition, Hawai'i Ecumenical Coalition, Sierra Club, and others vigorously opposed the launches, citing the threat to endangered species, the possibility of explosions, the release of toxic waste products, and the desecration of Kanaka Maoli cultural sites. The sandy dunes of west Kaua'i are known to be an ancient burial place for Kānaka Maoli. Despite successful efforts by the community to force the army to do an EIS, launches commenced in 1993. During the first launch, twenty-one persons were arrested for civil resistance. Fourteen more were arrested for climbing the fence of the base during the second launch. Although the STARS program was de-funded by President Bill Clinton in 1996, a new threat emerged in 1997—the Theater Missile Defense program. The navy sought to expand its launch and tracking facilities into Ni'ihau and other Northwest Hawaiian Islands. Although expansion into Ni'ihau has been halted due to disagreements between the State and the owners of Ni'ihau over environmental laws, missile defense testing has accelerated under the Bush administration. Since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the military has permanently restricted public access to the prime fishing, surfing, and recreation beaches near the PMRF.

**Waikāne/Marine Corps** Waikāne in the Ko'olaupoko District of O'ahu is rich in lore,<sup>55</sup> sacred sites, and traditional lo'i kalo (taro fields). In 1899 Lincoln McCandless acquired land in Waikāne and built a tunnel through the Ko'olau mountains in order to sell water to central O'ahu sugar growers. During World War II the army took control of 1,061 acres in Waikāne and adjoining Waiāhole to be used for training and bombing. The McCandless heirs granted the government a lease that was extended after the war and assumed by the Marine Corps in 1953. The McCandless heirs also gave a 187-acre parcel to the Kamaka family to settle a disputed land title.

In 1975 the Kamaka family and the McCandless heirs gave the marines notice to vacate, which they did on July 1, 1976. The Kamaka family farmed the land between 1976 to 1983, not knowing that it was contaminated with unexploded ordnance; the marines had told them it was clean. In the original lease, the military had agreed to clean the land before vacating. However, in 1989 the Marine Corps instead condemned the land and fenced it off. The Kamaka family lost their land, and Waikāne remains “off limits.”

**Pōhakuloa** Pōhakuloa on the island of Hawai'i is located high on the “saddle” between Mauna Kea, Mauna Loa, and Hualalai. The military established the Pōhakuloa Training Area (PTA) in 1956. Encompassing 116,341 acres, 84,815 acres

of which are “ceded lands,” the PTA is the largest U.S. military training area in Hawai‘i and the largest outside the continental United States. The army has identified 150 sites and 1,000 archaeological features within the PTA. It is the home to twenty-one endangered species of plants and animals, one of the highest concentrations of endangered species of any army installation in the world.

The military conducts major training activities, including bombing and artillery training, on twenty-three ranges. In 1981 Aloha ‘Āina Life Education Center, Greenpeace–Hawai‘i Island, and the Fund for Animals–Hawai‘i Island sued the army to halt training for failing to comply with environmental laws.<sup>56</sup> The suit, however, was dismissed.<sup>57</sup> In 1993 activists protested Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force training at Pōhakuloa. Houseless Kānaka Maoli joined the protest, pointing out the fact that Kānaka Maoli die waiting for homes while the military bombed Hawaiian Home Lands. The army proposes to acquire another 23,000 acres under its transformation program.

**Imua, Ke Ola Pono o Mākua (Go Forward in Justice, Mākua)** In the 1970s Kanaka Maoli activists carried the inspiration of the Kaho‘olawe movement to Mākua Valley. Today, Wai‘anae groups continue the struggle to free Mākua.

Mākua, which means “parents” in Hawaiian, is believed to be one place where Wākea (Sky Father) and Papahānaumoku (Earth Mother) came together to create life on earth. Kānaka Maoli consider Mākua to be part of a large wahi pana (sacred area) extending from Kea‘au around Ka‘ena to Kawaihāpai. At Ka‘ena, the westernmost tip of the island, is a leina-a-ka-‘uhane (soul’s leap), a large rock where souls of the dead are believed to leap into the spirit realm. Mākua is rich in mo‘olelo ka‘ao (historical accounts). The great cave Kāneana was once a home for the demigod Māui and his mother Hina.<sup>58</sup> One tale tells of a shark-man, Nanaue, who lived in Kāneana cave. He would enter the sea through an undersea passage and meet with the female mo‘o (lizard/dragon spirit) of Ko‘iahi Stream who would come down to the sea during heavy rains. The two would turn into beautiful human forms and make love on Pōhaku-kū-la‘i-la‘i in the crashing surf.<sup>59</sup>

Another mo‘olelo ka‘ao about Hi‘iaka-i-ka-poli-o-Pele and her sister Pele, the volcano goddess, recounts the adventures and miraculous deeds of Hi‘iaka in the Mākua vicinity. In what could be read as an allegory for the present struggle in Mākua, Hi‘iaka restored the life of a Mākua girl who was killed by an evil, invading kūpua (supernatural spirit). Hi‘iaka fought and defeated the intruder, who had killed the girl because she refused his advances. Hi‘iaka then taught the girl’s parents to use medicinal forest plants of Mākua to heal their daughter.<sup>60</sup>

The valley contains at least three documented heiau sites and numerous other ancient sites, while the beach contains many burials. Waters offshore have always been important fishing grounds. Mākua also contains critical habitat for numer-

ous native species, including over forty endangered species, some of which are found nowhere else in the world.

The military first began using a small area in Mākua Valley for a gun emplacement in 1929. Troop maneuvers were conducted at Mākua through the 1930s.

In December 1941, with the outbreak of World War II and the imposition of martial law, the military took control of the entire western tip of O‘ahu, including Mākua. By June 1942 the remaining private citizens were ordered to leave, and their lands condemned. In May 1943, at the request of the secretary of war, the Territorial government issued the army a revocable permit for the “duration of the present war and six months thereafter.”<sup>61</sup> The permit stipulated that the army must restore the valley to “satisfactory” condition at the expiration of the permit.

The evictions and destruction of the community traumatized Mākua residents. Mākua native Walter Kamana recalls, “I was small, used to run when the plane come in. The plane had no respect for people living in the valley. Only had one small church. You ever seen your church get bombed one Sunday? I seen that, small boy. I seen my church get taken away by a bomb.”<sup>62</sup>

After World War II, a decades-long struggle ensued between the army and the Territorial government over control of Mākua. In 1964, over the objections of Hawai‘i’s Governor John A. Burns, President Lyndon Johnson signed Executive Order 11166 designating 3,236 acres of the valley as a training facility.<sup>63</sup> The State leased an additional 1,515 acres to the army for sixty-five years for a mere dollar.

The military used Mākua for a wide variety of military training. The valley was bombed and strafed from the air, bombarded by battleships, invaded by amphibious assault teams, pounded by mortars, howitzers, and rockets, and burned with napalm. In the 1960s a man scavenging for scrap metal was killed.<sup>64</sup> The explosions, uncontrolled dumping of waste, and leakage from unexploded ordnance have released tons of toxic chemicals that contaminate the soil and groundwater.

Fires, of which there have been more than 270 over the last ten years, have caused serious harm to endangered species and human settlements. In 1970 the army allowed a fire to burn overnight before the State Forestry Division was notified. The blaze went out of control and moved toward Ka‘ena and Kuaokalā. It burned 1,525 acres before rains extinguished the fire two days later. State forester Herbert Kikukawa wrote to the army that the 1970 fire “converted the entire valley floor from dryland forest to a dense stand of highly flammable grass.”<sup>65</sup> In 1995 another fire scorched over half of the valley’s 4,700 acres and burned the shelters of families living across the highway, and in 2003 shifting winds ignited a wildfire that scorched over 2,000 acres and killed several populations of endangered plant species.

Kānaka Maoli continued to use and live on Mākua Beach during the years of military occupation despite periodic harassment by the police and state authori-



ties. In 1965, when the Mirisch Corporation filmed the motion picture *Hawaii* in Mākua Valley, the State issued an order to evict Mākua beach residents.<sup>66</sup> Before long, Kānaka Maoli had resettled the beach.<sup>67</sup>

In the 1970s Hawaiian activists made conscious efforts to link the movements for Kahoʻolawe and Mākua. Members of the Protect Kahoʻolawe ʻOhana discussed strategy at Mākua beach. Walter Ritte is quoted as having said, “Once we unite behind Kahoolawe, we can move to the next problem.”<sup>68</sup> In 1976 the Mākua Valley Reclamation and Restoration Association, the Hawaiian Coalition of Native Claims, and the Nānākuli-Waiʻanae Community Association organized a large rally at Mākua in solidarity with activists who were then occupying Kahoʻolawe.<sup>69</sup> Protesters defied the military fence and marched into the valley. For many, it was the first time seeing the devastation of the ʻāina.

When Hurricane Iwa struck in November 1982, forty families were displaced from Mākua beach. As the families attempted to rebuild their village, the State blocked resettlement. Mākua residents and supporters formed the Kōkua Mākua ʻOhana to rebuild and resettle Mākua beach. Hundreds rallied at Mākua to support the right for beach residents to live a traditional lifestyle.<sup>70</sup> On January 22, 1983, as residents began to rebuild their homes, the state arrested six persons for “obstructing governmental operations.” Refusing to stand for the judge or recognize the jurisdiction of the State court, the defendants said that because of the illegality of the military overthrow of 1893, the U.S. did not have title to the lands of Hawaiʻi.<sup>71</sup>

In 1992 the army applied for a permit to operate an Open Burn/Open Detonation (OB/OD) site in Mākua, which would have increased the amount of hazardous waste disposed there. Unbeknownst to the community until then, the army had conducted OB/OD activities in Mākua for many years without a permit. An Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) study documented that up to 2,500 tons of ammunition have been destroyed in a single year, with an average of 560 tons destroyed per year.<sup>72</sup> The community strongly opposed the OB/OD activities and forced the army to drop its plans and close the OB/OD site. The newly formed grassroots environmental justice group Mālama Mākua demanded that the army do an EIS for all of its activities in Mākua.

Meanwhile, the beach community at Mākua had grown to nearly two hundred people. Mākua had become their puʻuhonua (refuge) for families who had been ravaged by the Western system and whose broken lives and families were healed by the ʻāina. However, in 1996 beach residents were forced to organize the Mākua Council to fight yet another eviction. Despite numerous rallies and growing community support, on June 16 of that year hundreds of police invaded Mākua, cutting off media access to the scene and evicting the last residents from the beach. Some residents torched their homes in defiance. Sixteen persons were arrested and

eleven later convicted for “trespassing.” The standoff with the beach community was a glaring example of the contradiction between the landlessness and poverty of Kānaka Maoli and the military occupation of Hawaiian lands.<sup>73</sup>

Although the occupation of Mākua beach ended, confrontations over training continued. On Easter morning in 1997, the Hawai‘i Ecumenical Coalition and Mālama Mākua led a sunrise service on the shore, blocking a Marine Corps amphibious landing scheduled for that day. That victory has been commemorated every Easter in a sunrise service at Mākua. In September 1997 the marines again planned to hold an amphibious landing at Mākua. This time they announced their plans only days after thousands of mourners had gathered at Mākua beach to memorialize beloved Hawaiian musician Israel Kamakawiwo‘ole, who once lived at Mākua beach and whose ashes were scattered in its waters.

Outraged at the military’s arrogance, the community prepared for a confrontation. Religious structures were defiantly built in the path of the invading troops. A paepae (foundation platform) was dedicated to Papahonua and symbolized the new foundation for a community in Mākua. Another kuahu (shrine) was dedicated to Kanaloa, god of the sea, and linked Mākua spiritually to Kaho‘olawe.

As tensions mounted and calls for civil disobedience went out in the community, Admiral Joseph Prueher, commander in chief, Pacific Command, held an unprecedented meeting with community leaders at his headquarters in Camp Smith. The marines backed down and moved their amphibious landing to Bellows Air Force Station in Waimānalo, where their convoy was also protested.

In 1998 a lawsuit filed by Mālama Mākua and Earthjustice renewed the call for an EIS as required by the NEPA. The army suspended training in Mākua. At first the army refused to do an EIS, claiming that its training had “no significant impact.” Later they reached a settlement with Mālama Mākua to suspend training until completing a study that was “compliant with” the NEPA.

In 2000 the army released a flawed and incomplete environmental assessment (EA), which the community rejected. A coalition of groups, Hui Mālama o Mākua, mobilized support for the protection of the valley. The Hui organized numerous meetings, demonstrations, and a petition drive to raise awareness about the army’s impacts on Mākua and its implications for community health, cultural preservation, and the environment.

On January 27, 2001, over five hundred people packed a twelve-hour public hearing to testify about the enduring harm of the army’s activities in Mākua. The community gave impassioned testimony about family deaths and the high number of cancer cases in Wai‘anae, the hazardous waste dumped at Mākua, and the loss of subsistence resources and cultural sites. In all, over fifteen hundred persons testified in support of protecting Mākua.<sup>74</sup>

The army still maintained that its EA was adequate. Mālama Mākua chal-

lenged the EA in court and won a preliminary injunction against training until the case could be heard. At that point the community had halted military training in Mākua for three years.

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, changed the political landscape for the Mākua struggle. Evoking “national security” concerns, the army threatened to petition the court for an immediate return to training. Activists knew that the climate of jingoism immediately following the 9/11 attacks would work against their movement in the courts and in public opinion. Mālama Mākua decided to settle the NEPA lawsuit in order to secure certain gains and get a foothold in the valley that would give them leverage in the future. Under the settlement the army was required to complete an EIS within three years, clean UXO from approximately a third of the valley surface, and allow cultural access at least twice a month. The settlement also limited the number of days the army could train. The agreement, like the Kahoʻolawe consent decree, was controversial.

Regaining access to the valley has proven to be vital for cultural restoration and organizing. In December 2001 Nā ‘Ohana o Mākua held the first Makahiki ceremonies inside Mākua Valley in perhaps 160 years, signaling the return of Lono and peace to the valley.<sup>75</sup> Since regaining access, hundreds of people have been able to enter and witness the beauty of Mākua and the horror of the military’s destructive activities. At the closing of Makahiki season in Mākua, participants chanted:

E iho ana o luna	That which is above shall be brought down
E pi‘i ana o lalo	That which is below shall be lifted up
E hui ana nā moku	The islands shall be united
E kū ana ka paia	The walls (nation) shall stand upright
Imua, ke ola pono o Mākua!	Go forward, the pono life (justice) for Mākua! <sup>76</sup>

And so the struggle continues.

## Conclusion

The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, signaled the beginning of a new era. Under the pretext of fighting a war on terror, the United States has made an unprecedented bid for global dominance, from the highest reaches of space to the electronic frontiers of cyberspace. The military budget for 2003 reached an astonishing \$400 billion, an increase of 30 percent over the previous year’s budget. The proposed increase of \$48 billion alone is greater than the military budget of every other nation in the world.<sup>77</sup>

However, the 9/11 attacks also revealed a great lie of militarism—that military might equals security. The accelerated pace of globalization and its disruptions and the free flow of ideas and people, as well as resistance it enables, cannot be contained by military force. The new wave of militarization will make its inherent contradictions more pronounced and the world less secure. These sites of potential conflict provide opportunities for intervention and positive social change.

The U.S. military in Hawai‘i is mighty but not invincible. Many scholars now argue that the United States is in an unsustainable state of imperial overreach. People’s movements have successfully challenged the military and made significant changes in Hawai‘i. Kānaka Maoli and their concerns for land, culture, and sovereignty are central to demilitarization efforts in Hawai‘i. As militarism and capitalism have become fully globalized, resistance to these hegemonic forces has also gone global. There is a growing movement to close and clean up U.S. military bases in Okinawa, Korea, the Philippines, Guam, Vieques/Puerto Rico, Diego Garcia, Greenland, Germany, Great Britain, and in various locations within the United States. Progressive forces in Hawai‘i have joined these networks.<sup>78</sup>

This nascent international/global movement proclaims a radical new vision for the world where genuine security is based on human needs, human dignity, cultural integrity, environmental preservation, and global solidarity. In June 2000 the International Women’s Summit to Redefine Security concluded that “military security is a contradiction in terms. The present militarized international security system is maintained at the expense of the natural environment, the economic and social needs of many people, and fundamental human rights. This is a price we refuse to pay.”<sup>79</sup>

It is a price Hawai‘i cannot afford.

## Notes

1. See Gavan Daws, *Shoal of Time: A History of the Hawaiian Islands* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1968). Also Noel Kent, *Hawaii: Islands under the Influence* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983).

2. Ian Lind, “Ring of Steel: Notes on the Militarization of Hawaii,” *Social Process in Hawaii* 31 (1984/1985): 25–47.

3. Kathy Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull, *Oh, Say, Can You See? The Semiotics of the Military in Hawai‘i* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), xiii–xviii.

4. Lind, “Ring of Steel,” 27.

5. Lind, “Ring of Steel,” 27.

6. “Kānaka Maoli” will be used as an adjective to denote ideas, concepts, and things “Hawaiian.” “Kānaka Maoli” with the kahakō, or macron, will be used to refer to the plural noun “Hawaiian peoples.”

7. Brian McAllister Linn, *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902–1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 6.

8. The infamous “Bayonet Constitution” was never ratified by the people. It effectively shifted power to the white foreigners, barred Asian immigrants from voting and imposed property and income requirements for voting, which resulted in the disenfranchisement of the majority of Kānaka Maoli.

9. General Macomb, quoted in Lind, “Ring of Steel,” 25.

10. See J. Garner Anthony, *Hawaii under Army Rule* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1955).

11. Gary Okihiro, *Cane Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii, 1865–1945* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 201.

12. Lind, “Ring of Steel,” 36–37.

13. Sanford Zalburg, *A Spark Is Struck! Jack Hall and the ILWU in Hawaii* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1979).

14. Matsuo Takabuki, *An Unlikely Revolutionary: Matsuo Takabuki and the Making of Modern Hawai‘i* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1998), 66.

15. George Cooper and Gavan Daws, *Land and Power in Hawaii: The Democratic Years* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1990), 8.

16. Takabuki, *An Unlikely Revolutionary*, 64.

17. Cooper and Daws, *Land and Power in Hawaii*, 9.

18. Lind, “Ring of Steel,” 17.

19. Currently, Senator Inouye is the co-chair of the powerful Defense Appropriations Committee; Senator Akaka is the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee; and Representative Abercrombie sits on the House Armed Services Committee and the Readiness Subcommittee and Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee.

20. Haunani-Kay Trask, “Settlers of Color and ‘Immigrant’ Hegemony: ‘Locals’ in Hawai‘i,” *Amerasia Journal* 26 (2) (2000): 2–3.

21. U.S. Pacific Command, *Hawaii Land Use Master Plan*; U.S. Pacific Command, *Hawaii Military Installations and Training Areas* (Honolulu, 1998).

22. Lind, “Ring of Steel,” 36–37.

23. James Albertini et al., *The Dark Side of Paradise: Hawaii in a Nuclear World* (Honolulu: Catholic Action of Hawai‘i/Peace Education Project, 1980).

24. U.S. Pacific Command, *Hawaii Military Installations and Training Areas*.

25. U.S. Pacific Command, *Hawaii Military Installations and Training Areas*.

26. State of Hawai‘i, Department of Business, Economic Development, and Tourism, *State of Hawai‘i Data Book* (Honolulu: State of Hawai‘i, 2000).

27. The proposed army transformation in Hawai‘i would entail an increase of 480 troops, 400 armored vehicles, 32 construction projects, and the acquisition of 23,000 acres of land on Hawai‘i island and 2,000 acres of land on O‘ahu. See “Most Recent Public Scoping Meeting Presentation of U.S. Army Transformation in Hawaii” as delivered by Ron Borne at Nānākuli High and Intermediate School, April 30, 2002; William Cole, “Army to Transform on O‘ahu,” *Honolulu Advertiser*, April 22, 2002, B1.

28. Despite the fact that there has been a Department of Defense moratorium on training land acquisitions since 1990, the army claims it would need 98,000 contiguous acres of maneuver land. The largest contiguous parcel they currently have is 19,000 acres at Pōhakuloa. It defies common sense for the army to expand its land holdings in Hawai‘i by 79,000 acres, when much larger military installations are available on the continental

U.S. See Peter J. Offringa, Major General, U.S. Army, Assistant Chief of Engineers, *Memo-  
randum for SEE Distribution, Subject: Major Land Acquisition Moratorium*, DAEN-ZCI-A  
(405-10), November 30, 1990; 25th ID(L) and U.S. Army, *Hawaii Land Use Requirement  
Study*, prepared for USARPAC, USARHAW, 1997.

29. Cynthia Enloe, *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives*  
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 3.

30. Ferguson and Turnbull, *Oh, Say, Can You See?* xiii.

31. Lilikalā Kame'eleihiwa, *Native Land and Foreign Desires: Pehea Lā E Pono Ai?* (Hono-  
lulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1992), 25.

32. Sheryl Miyahira, "Hawaii's Ceded Lands," *UH Law Review* 3-4 (1981-1982):  
101-148.

33. Judy Lee Rohrer, "Hawaii and the Military: The Conflict over Land," unpublished  
report (Honolulu: American Friends Service Committee Hawai'i Area Program, 1987).

34. Under the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920, 187,000 acres were set aside  
for Kanaka Maoli homesteading to "rehabilitate" the race. Kānaka Maoli who met the 50  
percent blood quantum requirement were eligible to get homestead leases for a negligible  
price.

35. Hoaliku Drake, "Statement of Hoaliku Drake, Chair of the Hawaiian Homes Com-  
mission," *Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States  
Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, First Session* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government  
Printing Office, 1993), 193-199.

36. Greg Kakesako, "Lualualei," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, December 5, 1998.

37. Forty percent of the homeless or houseless are Kānaka Maoli; 31 percent of Kānaka  
Maoli receive annual incomes less than \$4,000; 32 percent drop out of high school; only 5  
percent have college degrees; and approximately 27 percent of welfare recipients are Kanaka  
Maoli. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, State of Hawai'i, *Native Hawaiian Data Book* (Hono-  
lulu: Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 2000), table 5.4. See also David Stannard, "The Hawai-  
ians: Health, Justice, and Sovereignty," and Healani Sonoda, "A Nation Incarcerated," in this  
volume.

38. Kānaka Maoli have the highest mortality rate, the lowest life expectancy (four years  
less than all other groups in Hawai'i), the highest cancer mortality rate, the highest stroke  
mortality rate, the highest diabetes mortality rate, and the highest infant mortality and sui-  
cide rates. Kekuni Blaisdell, "The Health Status of the Kānaka Maoli," *Asian American and  
Pacific Islander Journal of Health* 1 (2) (Autumn 1993).

39. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, *Native Hawaiian Data Book*, table 7.13.

40. *State of Hawai'i Data Book*, tables 10.4, 10.21, 1.03, 1.29.

41. Aimee Houghton and Lenny Siegel, *Military Contamination and Cleanup Atlas for  
the United States-1995* (San Francisco: Pacific Studies Center and CAREER/PRO, 1995).

42. Cobalt 60, a radioactive waste product from nuclear-powered ships, is found in  
sediment at Pearl Harbor. Between 1964 and 1978, 4,843,000 gallons of low-level radioac-  
tive waste was discharged into Pearl Harbor. Two thousand one hundred eighty-nine steel  
drums containing radioactive waste were dumped in an ocean disposal area fifty-five miles  
from Hawai'i. Nadine Scott, "Pearl Harbor Problems with Radioactive Waste," *Honolulu  
Star-Bulletin*, April 4, 1979.

43. The navy's Low Frequency Active Sonar (LFAS) damages the hearing of whales and

other marine mammals, which can lead to death. The navy conducts sonar tests off Kaua'i, O'ahu, and Hawai'i. Gretel H. Schueller, "Will Navy's New Sonar System Drown Out the Songs of Whales?" *Environment Hawai'i* 12 (2) (August 2001): 6–12.

44. In 1966–1967 the military tested the nerve gas agent GB and incapacitating agent BZ on Hawai'i Island only fourteen miles from Hilo. Albertini et al., *The Dark Side of Paradise*, 19–20.

45. Kīpuka are variations or changes in form. It is commonly used to describe oases of forest that survive lava flows and provide the seeds for the regeneration of life after the flows cool. Davianna Pōmaika'i McGregor writes, "Rural Hawaiian communities are cultural *kīpuka* from which Native Hawaiian culture can be regenerated and revitalized in the contemporary setting. Protection of the natural resources and the integrity of the lifestyle and livelihoods of the Hawaiians in these rural districts is essential to the perpetuation of Hawaiian culture." "An Introduction to the Hoā'aina and Their Rights," *Hawaiian Journal of History* 30 (1996): 14.

46. Ko Hema Lamalama O Kanaloa (Southern Beacon of Kanaloa) is the older name for Kaho'olawe. Some pronounce the name Kohe Mālamalama O Kanaloa (Sacred Refuge of Kanaloa). Noa Emmett Aluli and Davianna Pōmaika'i McGregor, "The Healing of Kaho'olawe," *Hawai'i: Return to Nationhood*, ed. Ulla Hasager and Jonathan Friedman (Copenhagen: International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs, Document no. 75, 1994), 197–208.

47. Rodney Morales, *Ho'ihō'i Hou: A Tribute to George Helm and Kimo Mitchell* (Honolulu: Bamboo Ridge Press, 1984).

48. Walter Ritte Jr. and Richard Sawyer, *Na Mana'ō Aloha o Kaho'olawe* (Honolulu: Aloha 'Āina o Nā Kūpuna, 1978), 3.

49. Quoted in Morales, *Ho'ihō'i Hou*, 55.

50. Quoted in Morales, *Ho'ihō'i Hou*, 72.

51. RIMPAC, or Rim of the Pacific, exercises are the largest multinational naval training exercises in the world. Kaho'olawe was once a regular RIMPAC target.

52. *Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Department of the Navy and the State of Hawai'i Concerning the Island of Kaho'olawe*, Hawai'i, 1994, 13.

53. Stu Glauberman, "Long, Winding Road of Controversy over H-3," *Honolulu Advertiser*, April 13, 1992; Kris M. Tanahara, "Halawa Valley Still in Dispute," *Honolulu Advertiser*, April 6, 1993; Kris M. Tanahara, "Marchers Mark Delay in Halawa Valley Work," *Honolulu Advertiser*, August 30, 1993.

54. Pat Omandam, "Rocky Road: Even with the Opening at Hand, Many Hawaiians Say Protests May Not End," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, December 4, 1997; Mike Yuen, "Open Road: After Decades of Controversy, the 16.1-mile Highway Will Soon Open for Business," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, December 3, 1997.

55. See "Hiiaka-i-ka-poli-o-Pele," *Hoku o Hawaii*, January 12, 1926, quoted in Elspeth P. Sterling and Catherine C. Summers, *Sites of Oahu* (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1978), 187.

56. Jim Borg, "Ecologists Sue to Halt Big Isle Army Exercises," *Honolulu Advertiser*, October 8, 1981.

57. "Request to Halt Maneuvers Denied," *Honolulu Advertiser*, October 9, 1981.

58. Dennis Kawaharada, ed., *Ancient O'ahu: Stories from Fornander and Thrum* (Honolulu: Kalamakū Press, 2001).
59. Marion Kelly and Sidney Michael Quintal, *Cultural History Report of Makua Military Reservation and Vicinity, Makua Valley, Oahu, Hawaii* (Honolulu: Bernice P. Bishop Museum, 1977), 8–10.
60. Stephen Desha Sr. and Julia Keonaona, “He Mo’olelo Ka’ao no Hi’iaka-i-ka-poli-o-Pele,” serial account published in *Ka Hōkū o Hawai’i* (September 18, 1924, to July 17, 1928), trans. Kepa Maly in *Oral History Study: Ahupua’a of Mākua and Kahanahāiki, District of Wai’anae Island of O’ahu*, PACDIV Contract Number N62742-94-D-0006 D.O. 22. PCH Project No. 442.0122, Institute for Sustainable Development (1998), A1–A13.
61. Ian Lind, “The Captive Valley of Mākua: 42 Years of Military Occupation,” *Ka Huliau*, May–June 1983.
62. “Mākua Valley Public Meeting Held on January 27, 2001” (Ralph Rosenburg Court Reporters), 59.
63. Lind, “The Captive Valley of Mākua.”
64. Pam Smith, “Makua: Valley of the Duds,” *Hawaii Observer*, June 16, 1977.
65. Smith, “Makua,” 20.
66. Kelly and Quintal, *Cultural History Report*, 48–49.
67. Peter Rosegg, “Quiet Beach Offers Home to Squatters,” *Honolulu Advertiser*, April 14, 1975; Helen Altonn, “Makua Beach Squatters Face Eviction,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, July 17, 1978.
68. Smith, “Makua,” 22.
69. Vickie Ong, “Hawaiians Raise Flag over Makua,” *Honolulu Advertiser*, February 29, 1976.
70. Robert W. Bone, “300 Rally Round Makua’s Traditional Lifestyle,” *Honolulu Advertiser*, January 3, 1983.
71. *Mākua: Sovereignty in Practice* (Kōkua Mākua ‘Ohana, 1983).
72. Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), *Final Report RCRA Facility Assessment for Makua Military Reservation, Oahu, Hawaii*, submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region IX. EPA ID No. HI7210022227 (1992), 14.
73. *Mākua: To Heal a Nation*, produced by Nā Maka o ka ‘Āina, 1996, videocassette.
74. Ka’iu Kauihou, a Wai’anae youth, testified: “If you don’t have a connection to the land, you are not going to feel what the land is feeling. And the bombing of Mākua isn’t just hurting the land, it is hurting us. . . . And that’s why I am here. Because I don’t want to hurt anymore.” Transcript from “Mākua Valley Public Meeting Held on January 27, 2001,” 99–100. Thomas Naki, a kupuna, said: “Stop the outrageous ‘military exercises’ now. . . . The exercises have taken away the life cycle of our environment as well as depleted our resources. To say that Mākua would surely become a ghost town is absurd and a vicious drum up of lies that’s been a repeated pattern again and again to somehow justify the continued bombing of Mākua.” “Mākua Valley Public Meeting Held on January 27, 2001,” 247–248.
75. Makahiki is the season of Lono, god of agriculture, peace, and creative arts. The season is marked by offerings to Lono, feasting, games, cultural activities, and a prohibition on war.
76. *Oli Hōōikaika* (Prophesy of the nation) is a traditional chant documented by David Malo. The last line was added for the Mākua Makahiki ceremony.



77. James Carroll, "Bush's Radical Shift in Military Policy," *Boston Globe*, February 19, 2002.

78. Some of the noteworthy groups working to end U.S. militarism are the East Asia-U.S. Women's Network Against Militarism, the Military Toxics Project, the Filipino American Coalition for Environmental Solutions, Arc Ecology, the Center for Public Environmental Oversight, the Comité Pro Rescate y Desarrollo de Vieques (Committee for the Rescue and Development of Vieques), the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the U.S.-Japan Committee for Racial Justice, I Tano-ta I Linala-ta (Our Land is Our Life), Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific, and the American Friends Service Committee Peacebuilding and Demilitarization Program Concentration Network.

79. East Asia-U.S. Women's Network Against Militarism, *International Women's Summit to Redefine Security: Final Statement, June 22–25, 2000*.